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Abstract 
During the recent years, organizations have been consolidating their purchasing volumes 
increasingly in order to achieve decreased purchasing costs and increased purchasing leverage 
through purchasing synergies. As most organizations tend to choose a hybrid model for their 
sourcing organization, the operational tasks of procurement remain in the hands of individuals and 
units across the organization while the responsibility over creating and managing supplier 
relationships is transferred to a central purchasing unit. However, such setting is ideal for the non-
compliant purchasing behavior, maverick buying, to occur, causing the organization major losses of 
expected cost savings. 
While maverick buying has recently been studied as a phenomenon, the approach on reducing it 
has been after the consolidation of purchasing volumes. In this paper, the emphasis is moved to an 
earlier stage of the process. The previous suggestions on ways to reduce maverick buying are 
critically examined and their strengths and weaknesses are identified. Furthermore, a new approach 
of organizational change caused by the purchasing consolidation is introduced. The findings of this 
paper suggest that when this organizational change is managed poorly, the poor level of 
commitment to change occurs as maverick buying. Thus, the two most common approaches on 
organizational change, planned and emergent change processes, are presented and connected to 
consolidating purchasing volumes and reducing maverick buying. In doing so, this paper provides 
direction for future research and for identifying concrete suggestions on preventing maverick 
buying. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the recent years, procurement is executed more and more through consolidating 
purchasing volumes and negotiating corporate level framework contracts by a central 
purchasing unit (cf. Karjalainen et al., 2009). Through these contracts organizations aim at 
benefitting from purchasing synergies, resulting in decreased purchasing costs and increased 
purchasing leverage. However, in most cases while the responsibility over negotiating the 
contracts and managing the supplier relationships is moved to the central procurement unit, 
the day-to-day act of procurement as ordering and buying the products and services is left or 
delegated to various individuals and units around the organization, both in purchasing and 
non-purchasing (Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016; Karjalainen, 2011). This type of a sourcing 
organization is called the hybrid model (Karjalainen, 2011); a combination of centralized 
and decentralized purchasing. Most organizations tend to opt for some version of this model 
(Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016; Karjalainen, 2011). Thus, in this paper purchasing 
centralization does not necessarily refer to a fully centralized sourcing organization but 
rather to a hybrid one. 
Achieving the above mentioned expected benefits of volume centralization is only possible 
through compliance to the framework contracts, however (Karjalainen et el., 2009). The 
phenomenon of non-compliant purchasing behavior, maverick buying, results in major 
losses of expected cost savings. Maverick buying (MB) is defined as “the off-contract buying 
of goods and services for which an established procurement process is in place based on pre-
negotiated contracts with selected suppliers” (Karjalainen et al., 2009, p.248). It means the 
individuals and units responsible for the operational purchasing tasks neglecting to use the 
framework contracts for one reason or another, and can be recognized as the “hidden action” 
in the principal-agent problem (Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015). 
Studies focusing solely on maverick buying are rather recent and as Karjalainen et al. (2009) 
stated, very little research had been conducted on the matter prior to their study. Recently 
however, studies focusing on defining the phenomenon, identifying its forms and reasons 
behind them (Karjalainen et al., 2009), factors that contribute to it (Karjalainen and van 
Raaij, 2011) and suggestions of possible remedies against it (eg. Karjalainen and van Raaij, 
2011; Kulp et al., 2006; Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015; Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016) have 
emerged. While these studies have provided an extensive understanding on maverick buying 
and its aspects, they have focused on its occurrence after the implementation of framework 
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agreements. However, the issue could be examined and addressed already during the 
tendering process (cf. Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015) and thus the emphasis could me moved 
from reducing MB to preventing it. 
A yet to be examined area of the study is maverick buying in the context of organizational 
change. While organizations consolidate their purchasing volumes, procurement tasks and 
authorities are newly delegated between the central purchasing unit and individuals and units 
of the organization creating an organizational change. Thus, the control mechanisms should 
be changed in accordance (Kulp et al., 2006). In order to grasp this aspect of the issue, it is 
logical to look into the literature of organizational change. 
In this paper maverick buying and preventing it in particular are examined in the context of 
organizational change. As its study objectives, this paper aims at examining previous 
suggestions on reducing maverick buying critically and providing a new approach against 
the problem through the context of organizational change. Thus, the study questions are: 
1. What are the most common suggested ways to reduce maverick buying? 
2. Do they work and if not, why? 
3. Can maverick buying be linked to the context of organizational change? 
4. Does this context help in identifying ways to prevent the problem from occurring? 
The limitations of this paper include that it is not specified to apply for certain organization 
type as public or private organizations. Furthermore, the contribution of this paper remains 
at a theoretical level and empirical testing on the matter is needed. Thus, this paper does not 
aim at presenting concrete procedures on preventing maverick buying but rather contributes 
by introducing an approach that may enable doing so in future studies. 
First, the definitions and theoretical foundations of maverick buying are gone through while 
identifying maverick buying as a principal – agent problem. To continue, the paper moves 
onto presenting the consequences, the forms and the reasons and the contributing factors to 
maverick buying. Following, in the next section some of the most commonly suggested 
remedies against maverick buying are critically examined seeking to identify their strengths 
and weaknesses as ways to reduce MB. Finally, in the fifth section of the paper the context 
of organizational change is introduced and some less technical ideas on reducing maverick 
buying are presented in this context. Concluding the study, the managerial implications and 
findings alongside with suggestions for future research are summarized in the final two 
sections of this paper. 
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2. Definitions and theoretical foundations of maverick buying 
 
2.1 Definitions of maverick buying 
Maverick buying (MB) is the phenomenon of non-compliant purchasing behavior within an 
organization. As Karjalainen et al. (2009) point out, there are various definitions for 
maverick buying available in the earlier literature. In most of these definitions the emphasis 
is on defining the way that the buying is conducted whereas only few such as the one by 
Hornyak (1999) also bring up things that are affected by MB, such as purchase prices. What 
makes buying maverick is thus dependent on the way it is executed, that way being 
nonconforming purchase behavior as Roy (2003) defines it. According to Kulp et al. (2006) 
purchase compliance is purchasing an approved item from a contracted supplier at the 
contracted price within the approved purchasing process. Anything other would thus be non-
compliance or nonconforming behavior which again can be defined as maverick buying. 
Karjalainen et al. (2009, p.248) define maverick buying as “the off-contract buying of goods 
and services for which an established procurement process is in place based on pre-
negotiated contracts with selected suppliers”. With off-contract buying they refer to 
employees, or “internal clients” as Cox et al. (2005) put it, both in purchasing and non-
purchasing failing or neglecting to use ready-negotiated corporate level framework contracts 
for various reasons. In addition to referring to this as off-contract buying, Cox et al. (2005) 
point out that maverick buying does not contribute to optimizing value for money due to the 
procedures through which it is conducted. The procedures used in maverick buying are not 
the formal processes and authorized suppliers defined by the organization (Angeles and 
Nath, 2007). Other definitions include wider interpretations such as defining MB as the 
overall proportion of an organization’s spend outside of any formal process (Lonsdale & 
Watson, 2005), buying done not using available contracts (De Boer et al., 2002) or 
employees circumventing corporate purchase policies (Hornyak, 1999). 
2.2 Maverick buying in indirect spend categories 
It has been identified that maverick buying tends to occur more in certain spend categories. 
That is in indirect-product purchases as Kulp et al. (2006) confirm. Typical examples of 
indirect spend are such as maintenance, repair and operations items, traveling, office supplies 
and information technology. 
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It is common for organizations to create supplier relationships by selecting suppliers and 
negotiating and implementing contracts through tender processes by a corporate level 
procurement team, or a strategic sourcing group (Cuganesan and Lee, 2006). The supplier 
relationships are mostly created and managed from that corporate level. However, when it 
comes to indirect spend in particular, the daily act of procurement is often decentralized to 
employees within individual business units requiring the indirect goods or services 
(Cuganesan and Lee, 2006). The control over the actual buying is thus out of the 
responsibility of the people negotiating the contracts. This can be seen to provide an ideal 
environment for maverick buying to occur as such setting decreases the spend visibility 
which again results in difficulties for the organization to control its contract compliance 
(Angeles and Nath, 2007). 
Cuganesan and Lee (2006) continue that companies’ line personnel often purchase their own 
indirect products and services from non-approved suppliers. They also suggest that this is 
not only because of the employees being unaware of the contracts available and of the 
preferred suppliers but also due to the fact that indirect spend is often seen as unimportant 
and inconvenient (Cuganesan and Lee, 2006). Thus, the internal clients responsible for the 
actual indirect purchases might not see it as that severe to not comply with the organization’s 
procedures even if they know of them. However, there is also the managerial side of the 
issue. Indirect spend is often not considered to be strategic (Cuganesan and Lee, 2006), 
which affects the procurement team’s motivation to oversee the day-to-day act of 
procurement of indirect spend as well. Indirect goods and services are also perceived to be 
ones of standardized quality and easy to access from suppliers (Cuganesan and Lee, 2006). 
This would suggest the line-personnel are left with lots of task autonomy in their purchasing 
tasks as the central procurement team is more focused on direct spend categories and trust 
the employees to make successful indirect purchases from approved suppliers. 
2.3 The Principal-Agent problem 
Recent studies have identified maverick buying to be occurring as a principal-agent problem 
and it being an instance of “hidden action” in this relationship (eg. Kauppi and van Raaij, 
2015; Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016).  A principal – agent relationship is defined “as a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)), engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.308). In the case of maverick 
buying, the individuals across the organization having the authority for the actual ordering 
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and buying act as agents. Meanwhile, the central purchasing unit negotiating the framework 
contracts acts as the principal trying to engage the employees to comply with organization’s 
purchasing procedures and to use the contracts. The principal – agent problem is created 
when the principal and agents have conflicting interests and the principal should verify and 
monitor the agent’s actual doings which in this case would be ensuring the proper use of the 
framework contracts (Karjalainen et al., 2009). As Jensen and Meckling (1976) state, the 
agents will not always act in the best interests of the principal, and thus the principal-agent 
problem arises in maverick buying. 
According to Rothkopf and Pibernik (2016) maverick buying can be considered as a hidden 
action in the principal - agent problem. With hidden action they refer to the fact that when 
delegating the operational purchasing tasks to the agent, the principal cannot observe 
whether or not the agent complies with using the framework contracts. Kauppi and van Raaij 
(2015) refer to this as an information imbalance after contracting; the principal cannot 
monitor, attribute or evaluate the agent’s effort; or at least cannot do so without taking costly 
measures to ensure it (Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016). Jensen and Meckling (1976) confirm 
that is it generally impossible for the principal to ensure the agent’s acting in the best interest 
of the organization at zero cost. When the agent decides on bypassing the preferred 
procedures it causes disadvantages on the principal’s side as they lose the benefits gained by 
the volume consolidation (Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016). According to Kauppi and van Raaij 
(2015) goal incongruence and asymmetry of information are interrelated factors contributing 
to this hidden action of maverick buying in the principal – agent relationship. The goals of 
the central purchasing unit and the agent may differ and the principal not knowing the agent’s 
actions and needs, this gets transferred to the framework contracts and ordering channels 
(Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015), causing maverick buying. 
To sum up, in this paper we define maverick buying as the non-compliant purchasing 
behavior where the internal clients of an organization engage in off-contract buying of goods 
and services for which a pre-negotiated framework contract with selected suppliers is in 
place (cf. Karjalainen et al., 2009). The off-contract buying may refer to buying from a non-
contracted supplier, a non-contracted item, at a non-contracted price or outside the approved 
purchasing process (Kulp et al., 2006). As mentioned earlier, maverick buying is most 
typical in indirect spend categories, where the operational purchasing tasks such as the daily 
act of ordering are delegated by the central purchasing unit acting as the principal to various 
individuals across the organization acting as agents (Cuganesan and Lee, 2006). Maverick 
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buying occurs thus as a hidden action in the principal – agent problem (Kauppi and van 
Raaij, 2015; Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016) as the central purchasing unit tries to observe and 
ensure that the employees requiring the products and services would use the pre-negotiated 
framework contracts. However, they cannot verify this compliance or non-compliance 
without it being difficult or costly. Maverick buying is thus problematic for organizations 
consolidating their purchasing volumes. In the next sections of this paper MB is examined 
more closely from different aspects with the final aim of finding ways to reduce it. 
3. Consequences and different forms of maverick buying and its contributing 
factors 
 
3.1 Consequences of maverick buying 
According to Karjalainen et al., (2009), maverick buying is mainly seen to have only 
negative consequences in the previous literature. This is due to the hidden costs distinctive 
for maverick buying; even if a single individual or unit was successful in achieving better 
prices or contract terms, the total cost of ownership for the whole organization would still 
suffer. Thus, the starting point in this paper is to examine maverick buying as a negative 
phenomenon. Some estimates on the costs of MB include +20% increased procurement costs 
(Angeles and Nath, 2007) or up to 20-30% of lost cost savings as was the case of the 
pharmaceutical company GSK (Kulp et al., 2006). 
Maverick buying results in consequences of two main categories: increased purchasing costs 
and reduced purchasing leverage (Karjalainen et al., 2009). In other words, maverick buying 
causes the organization a negative cost effect and a worse position in future negotiation 
situations. Separated to more specific elements, the consequences of MB include 
fragmentation of spend, higher purchasing prices, increased purchasing process costs and 
finally decreased purchasing leverage (cf. Karjalainen et al., 2009; Cox et al., 2005). Roy 
(2003) makes an additional point on maverick buying not only causing losses for the byer 
side but also for the supplier’s sales. In most cases the seller has agreed for lower prices for 
higher volumes while closing a contract and while the buyer never meets these expected high 
volumes due to maverick buying, the seller encounters losses. However, in this paper the 
focus is solely on the consequences of the buyer side as maverick buying is viewed from the 
purchasing organization point of view throughout the paper. In this section the negative 
consequences of maverick buying are presented and gone through as listed in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The consequences of maverick buying. 
As Cox et al. (2005) state, maverick buying results in further fragmentation of spend. That 
is when a demand for a product is spread across many suppliers (Lonsdale and Watson, 
2005). Some fragmentation of spend is natural for every organization to have but the issue 
becomes problematic when the level of fragmentation exceeds the “normal” level, as might 
happen caused by maverick buying (Lonsdale and Watson, 2005). This is explained by the 
numerous individuals across the organization, both in purchasing and non-purchasing, 
buying products and services from their own preferred suppliers rather than the contracted 
approved suppliers, resulting in unnecessary amount of separate transactions. Thus, the 
organization’s purchasing volumes spread and its spend gets fragmented. This leads to the 
decrease of the relationship between volume and value that is present in most agreements as 
Cox et al. (2005) say. They also confirm that ‘equivalent’ products are often purchased from 
a large number of suppliers. Fragmentation of spend itself is not a major problem but as it 
corresponds to the other negative consequences of maverick buying identified in this paper, 
its relevance gets highlighted. 
Another consequence of maverick buying is higher purchasing prices. As Cox et al. (2005) 
stated, maverick buying is not optimal for maximizing value for money. When purchases are 
made decentralized across the organization, especially by the non-purchasing employees, it 
is probable that the necessary expertise does not always exist. This expertise can include the 
skills for finding the right supplier, for the tendering process and for negotiating a contract 
and its terms for example. Cox et al. (2005) support this by stating that maverick buyers 
probably do not have access to the necessary supply market information nor possess the 
required competence in contracting and negotiating. The lack of relevant information on the 
supply market, or on existing contracts of the organization, combined with an incompetence 
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to properly tender and negotiate contract will eventually lead to higher purchasing prices 
among other consequences (Cox et al., 2005). Kuganesan and Lee (2006) confirm that 
buying from non-approved suppliers happens often with significantly higher prices than 
buying from contracted suppliers. As maverick buying indeed is often off-contract buying 
from non-approved suppliers, the result is higher purchasing prices and a negative cost effect 
for the organization. Furthermore, as stated above, fragmentation of spend further 
contributes to the organization experiencing higher purchase prices due to each separate 
transaction is of limited value which leads again leads to higher product costs (Cox et al., 
2005). The two are thus connected and the negative impact can be multiplied. 
Karjalainen et al. (2009) point out that the increased purchasing costs caused by maverick 
buying are not only due to the actual purchasing prices being higher but also due to the 
additional costs in the purchasing process. Fragmentation of spend results in the number of 
overall transactions growing unnecessarily large (Cox et al., 2005). This eventually leads to 
increased transaction costs, which in this context are regarded as purchasing process costs. 
Lonsdale and Watson (2005) add that the high number of fragmented spend and thus a large 
number of suppliers can be seen in transaction costs also through the organization having to 
establish and manage trading relations with all of the suppliers. Yet another aspect of 
purchasing process costs increased by maverick buying is that the large number of new non-
contracted suppliers and transactions through them also result in additional paper work and 
other managerial work (Roy, 2003). The increased purchasing costs thus also include the 
increased work and effort and labor costs. 
Cox et al. (2005) among others state that maverick buying also results in loss of commercial 
leverage, or purchasing leverage as named in this paper. Yet again, this loss of leverage is 
highly linked with the increased spend fragmentation as well; both in current contracted 
supplier relationship and future purchasing situations. When the spend volumes are 
fragmented, leverage opportunities are not possible and the buyer is significantly less 
attractive in the eyes of the supplier (Cox et al., 2005). In other words, maverick buying 
causes the organization to have less negotiation power as a buyer. The procurement team 
has thus less ability to secure better prices and contract terms for the organization as 
Cuganesan and Lee (2006) put it. Lonsdale and Watson (2006) further explain this problem 
by the organization’s ability to no longer offer the suppliers high volumes of demand nor an 
appealing account to serve. The organization thus loses their credibility with suppliers 
having agreed for lower prices for higher volumes but in fact never receiving those volumes 
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(Roy, 2003). Consequently, the buyer may become a nuisance customer for suppliers 
(Michels and Yakos, 2003, cited in Lonsdale and Watson, 2006) and the suppliers are 
unlikely to put much effort or commitment into developing the relationship (Roy, 2003). 
Thus, as stated, maverick buying affects the way suppliers see the organization negatively; 
both in current contracted relationships as well as in future tendering projects which again 
will result in less affordable offers and deals. 
To conclude, the consequences of maverick buying are of negative nature for organizations. 
They are more or less connected to each other and involve the fragmentation of spend for 
most part. As Cox et al. (2005) refer to individuals or departments having power resources 
which can be drawn upon to either help, or hinder, change within an organization, maverick 
buying can be seen as a negative such. It could be thus claimed that maverick buying is a 
preventer of successful organizational changes in addition to causing a negative cost effect. 
It is thus of the essence to understand the phenomenon and the factors affecting it better. 
3.2 Forms of maverick buying 
As there are so many similar yet different definitions for maverick buying to be found in the 
literature, it is assumable that maverick buying varies in its forms as well and can be different 
depending on the context. The previous section of this paper found that maverick buying has 
several negative consequences for an organization. This leads us to examining the different 
forms of maverick buying resulting in those consequences more closely. Karjalainen et al. 
(2009) have identified five different forms of maverick buying through an extensive 
literature review which are presented in Figure 2 alongside with the main reasons behind 
them. These five forms are unintentional MB, forced MB, casual MB, well-intentioned MB 
and ill-intentioned MB. 
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Figure 2: The five forms of maverick buying and the main reasons behind them (Karjalainen et al., 2009). 
The first form of MB identified by Karjalainen and al. (2009) is unintentional maverick 
buying. As its name reveals, unintentional maverick buying occurs when employees are 
buying off-contract but do not do this intentionally; they do not know there is a framework 
agreement in place (Karjalainen et al., 2009) or are unaware of the approved suppliers 
(Cuganesan and Lee, 2006). They don’t thus ignore the procedures set by the organization 
on purpose. This type of non-motivated off-contract buying can be thus result of 
unfamiliarity with corporate purchasing policies, lack of awareness of the correct processes 
or lack of information on the negotiated contracts communicated internally in the 
organization (Karjalainen et al., 2009). Karjalainen et al. (2009) also point out that 
unintentional maverick buyers have no intention in harming the organization through their 
actions and thus the behavior cannot be named to be deviant. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
classified as compliant either so it is perceived as maverick buying from the organization 
point of view. 
The second form of MB named is forced maverick buying. Unlike in the previous form of 
MB, in forced maverick buying the employees are aware of the organization’s purchasing 
policies but are unable to comply with those preferred processes due to some barrier 
preventing them from doing so (Karjalainen et al., 2009). Such barrier might be a need for a 
new item that hasn’t been contracted yet or of which a contract isn’t in use yet for example 
(Kulp et al., 2006). Another scenario that might result in employees engaging in forced MB 
is a supply problem of an approved supplier forcing them to buy the item needed off-contract 
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from a local supplier instead. Ferneley and Sobreperez (2006) call such situation a 
workaround in an emergency situation. Croom and Brandon-Jones (2007) on the other hand 
point out that in order for employees to be able to comply with new purchasing routines, 
they need to be provided with adequate support and training. The opposite might yet again 
lead to forced MB as the employees wouldn’t possess the skills needed to do compliant 
purchases. As in the given examples, the employees’ lack of compliance in forced maverick 
buying is not due to their motivational intentions either; they are simply unable to buy 
according to the preferred processes. 
Casual MB is the third form of MB identified by Karjalainen et al. (2009). It is like forced 
maverick buying but in this case there is no barrier stopping the employees from complying 
with the organization’s preferred processes. The employees are aware of the purchasing 
policies but continue to do as they please; they buy both within and outside contracts 
depending on which serves them the best (Karjalainen et al., 2009). Again, their behavior is 
not driven by intentions or motivations to harm the organization but rather by self-interest; 
they feel reluctant to change their old habits as Karjalainen et al. (2009) put it. Other reasons 
include lack of guiding towards preferred behavior by management, lack of understanding 
of the costs their behavior brings with it to the organization or a lack of incentives directing 
employees to use the preferred processes and suppliers (Karjalainen et al., 2009; Gelderman 
et al., 2006). In other words, casual maverick buying occurs when it is allowed to occur; the 
employees don’t want to change their old habits and are not encouraged nor forced to do so. 
The fourth form of MB named is well-intentioned maverick buying. Unlike in the previous 
forms of MB, well-intentioned maverick buying occurs when the employees are motivated 
to behave as they do. They are aware of the preferred process and there is no barrier stopping 
them from buying them item from an approved supplier but they still do so (Karjalainen et 
al., 2009). However, they still do not mean any harm for the organization. Spreitzer and 
Sonensheim (2004) refer to such behavior as positive deviance; intentional actions where 
the employee believes to be acting in the organization’s best interest. Karjalainen et al. 
(2009) list that reasons for an employee to engage in well-intentioned MB include them 
either perceiving an alternative offer better than the contracted one or perceiving their own 
purchasing skills better than the ones of the central procurement unit negotiating the existing 
contracts. They add that both motivations to engage in well-intentioned MB can be explained 
by the employee’s lack of understanding of the total cost of ownership (TCO) of the 
purchases, lack of convincing use cases of the existing contract or the employee’s product 
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knowledge. Lack of insight being the main reason behind such feelings of superiority 
(Karjalainen et al., 2009) suggests that the employees don’t fully comprehend that the TCO 
doesn’t only include the price of the product or service but also the contract terms, the 
process costs and the labor put into it both by the central procurement unit and the employees 
themselves. 
The last of the five forms of MB identified by Karjalainen et al. (200) is ill-intentioned 
maverick buying. It is the only one of the five forms where the employees choose not to use 
the preferred processes and approved suppliers because of their motivation being to actively 
oppose them. Whereas well-intentioned MB could be included as Spreitzer and 
Sonensheim’s (2004) positive deviance, they refer to behavior like ill-intentioned maverick 
buying as negative deviance. Karjalainen et al. (2009) identify two main reasons to cause 
such deviant behavior; the first being opportunism. As Cox et al. (2005) state, employees 
may often have personal and conflicting preferences in procurement both about certain 
products and suppliers. Using the preferred policies might thus not be in the best interest of 
an employee or their unit. Cox et al. (2005) add that when there is a conflict between the 
employees’ loyalties to the organization and the ones of their department, themselves or their 
career, the employees will often make purchasing decisions that drive their own personal 
advantage. The second reason for ill-intentioned maverick buying is resistance to change 
(Harris, 2002, cited in Karjalainen et al., 2009). When corporate level framework agreements 
are negotiated, it often affects the purchasing dynamics of an organization. Ambrose et al. 
(2002) list four main reasons for work place sabotage which ill-intentioned MB can be seen 
as a part of. These four reasons are powerlessness, frustration, boredom, facilitation of work 
and injustice. Linked to resistance to change these negative feelings may correlate to 
employees feeling that ready available contracts decrease their own power in the decision-
making process or that the decision comes up-down from the management without the 
personnel being adequately involved in the contracting process. Furthermore, personal 
feelings of injustice towards the employees themselves or to a former but no longer 
contracted supplier may arise (Karjalainen et al., 2009). 
To summarize, in order to truly understand the reasons behind maverick buying and 
furthermore to be able to find explanations and possible remedies for it, one must understand 
the different ways in which MB occurs; in other words, the forms of it. The above section of 
this paper has aimed at doing so by listing the five forms of maverick buying and the 
underlying reasons behind them identified by Karjalainen et al. (2009). Those were 1. 
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unintentional maverick buying caused by the employees being unaware of the contracts and 
preferred processes, 2. forced maverick buying where the employees were met with a barrier 
such as lack of skills to comply with preferred processes or a new yet to be contracted 
purchase need forcing them to buy maverick, 3. casual maverick buying where the 
employees’ decision to buy within or outside the contracts is driven by self-interest due to 
reluctance to change old habits, 4. well-intentioned maverick buying caused by the 
employees 
 thinking that they’re acting in the organization’s best interest when following their 
perceived superior offer or own purchasing skills, and finally 5. ill-intentioned maverick 
buying where the employees intentionally engage in MB due to opportunism or change 
resistance while acknowledging this may cause harm to the organization. Knowing the forms 
of MB and the main reasons causing them makes it possible to examine the factors that 
contribute to maverick buying, which is done in the next section of this paper. 
3.3 Contributing factors to maverick buying 
Having examined the forms of MB and the reasons behind them it is possible to search for 
underlying causal mechanisms behind maverick buying (Karjalainen et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, in order to find ways to prevent maverick buying, it is important to understand 
the factors that contribute to it. Karjalainen and van Raaij (2011) aimed at doing so through 
an empirical test on the individual factors correlating with certain forms of maverick buying; 
well-intentioned MB where the employee seeks to achieve better terms and conditions (form 
1), unintentional MB where the employees are simply unaware of the existing contracts 
(form 2) and casual MB to maintain existing supplier relationships (form 3). Through an 
empirical test they proposed and tested nine contingency variables and were able to identify 
four of those contributing to employees engaging in the above mentioned forms of maverick 
buying. These variables are presented and briefly explained below in table 1. However, in 
this paper we focus on examining the three first contingency variables more closely, those 
being task autonomy, training on purchasing both in general and on purchasing practices in 
use and communication and involvement; those three factors were found to be the most 
notable ones while age was found not to be as prominent (Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011). 
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Contingency 
variable 
Contribution to the three forms of maverick buying 
Task autonomy Higher task autonomy increases all of the three forms. 
Training 
on purchasing 
Lack of general purchasing training increases the forms 2 and 3. 
Communication and 
involvement 
Lack of communication and involvement in the process with the central purchasing 
unit increases form 1. 
Age Older age contributes to form 1. 
Table 1: The contributing factors to maverick buying (cf. Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011). 
According to the empirical test of Karjalainen and van Raaij (2011) task autonomy in 
purchasing is the single most important contingency variable that affects one’s tendency to 
engage in maverick buying. They found this variable to be particularly related to maverick 
buyers who are trying to get better terms and conditions than the ones of frame agreements 
as well as maverick buyers who are seeking to maintain the current supplier relationships 
with non-approved suppliers. Employees engaging in such behavior typically have more task 
autonomy. However, the test showed this to be a typical factor for unintentional maverick 
buyers as well. Taking these results into account, reducing task autonomy seems to be the 
most effective of the contextual variables against all of these three forms of maverick buying, 
as the empirical test of Karjalainen and van Raaij (2011) suggests. 
Lack of training on purchasing, both on purchasing in general and on purchasing activities 
in particular, was another significant contributing factor identified by Karjalainen and van 
Raaij (2011). Mainly, they recognized this as a contingency variable contributing to 
unintentional maverick buying; not only were the employees unaware of the existing 
contracts but they also did not possess the skills to look for possible pre-existing framework 
agreements. Thus, training the employees on the purchasing practices in use in their 
organization would reduce unintentional MB. Karjalainen and van Raaij (2011) also state 
that general purchasing training is likely to promote ones purchasing skills and awareness 
on purchasing practices of the organization. In addition, personnel that are less trained on 
purchasing in general and on purchasing practices of the organization are also those who are 
more likely to engage in MB that aims at maintaining an existing supplier relationship 
(Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011). 
Communication and involvement was the third and final notable contingency variable that 
Karjalainen and van Raaij (2011) discovered in relation to maverick buying. That is, with 
maverick buying to get improved terms and conditions compared to the ones of framework 
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agreements of the organization. Their finding was that lack of communication and 
involvement with the typically centralized corporate level purchasing unit contributes to 
employees engaging in that kind of well-intentioned MB. Furthermore, they found that the 
opposite would probably convince the employees that their purchasing needs were met in 
the final framework agreements (Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011). 
To conclude, when examining these three types of maverick buying, Karjalainen and van 
Raaij (2011) were able to identify three notable contingency variables that contribute to their 
occurrence as well as one less prevalent one. Task autonomy, lack of training on purchasing 
in general and on purchasing activities and lack of communication and involvement between 
the central purchasing unit and the employees in the purchasing process were the factors that 
contributed the most to employees engaging in MB while age was just a mildly contributing 
factor. Out of those, task autonomy was the variable found to increase maverick buying of 
all three forms the most and thus seems to be the most prominent of the factors. However, 
the results of Karjalainen and van Raaij’s (2011) study are limited on certain forms of 
maverick buying so the existence of other contributing factors is not excluded. In this paper 
it is assumed that the contributing factors presented in this section could however be more 
or less applied to other forms of maverick buying as well. In doing so, this paper aims at 
connecting the factors to ways of reducing maverick buying. To sum up, Karjalainen and 
van Raaij’s (2011) findings on factors contributing to maverick buying further explain one’s 
tendency to engage in such behavior. Furthermore, they give suggestions on what should be 
taken into account when searching for possible ways to reduce maverick buying. Having 
presented the consequences of MB and why organizations should aim at reducing it, listed 
the forms and reasons behind it and explained the factors contributing to it, this paper now 
moves onto the next section where previous suggestions on ways to reduce maverick buying 
are examined critically. 
4. Ways to reduce maverick buying 
 
As Karjalainen et al. (2009) state, identifying the forms of maverick buying and the 
underlying reasons behind them may help practitioners in designing mechanisms for 
reducing it. Surely, identifying the contributing factors behind certain forms of MB bring as 
done above further help in doing so by providing managerial implications on reducing 
maverick buying, which Karjalainen and van Raaij (2011) confirm. In the previous literature 
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some suggestions over possible ways to prevent and /or treat maverick buying have been 
given. In this section, the four most common suggestions from previous literature as 
presented in figure 3 are critically examined in groups of two; they are e-procurement, the 
P-card, reward sanction systems and monitoring. They are more or less connected to each 
other and this paper now aims at evaluating their efficiency as remedies against maverick 
buying. 
 
Figure 3: Ways to reduce maverick buying. 
4.1 E-procurement and P-cards 
Many companies use e-procurement tools in order to decrease the total delivered costs of 
products and services (Kulp et al., 2006). They do so wishing to achieve facilitated 
communication, increased competition between suppliers and transformation to less costly 
online negotiations instead of face-to-face ones (Kulp et al., 2006). Implementation of e-
procurement tools is thus expected to result in easier supplier negotiations, less purchasing 
effort and increased spend visibility. Such tools include for example online-ordering 
systems, content aggregators and internally developed decision-support tools (Kulp et al., 
2006). The purchase card (P-card) on the other hand is a payment method promoting the use 
of the approved suppliers and a component of e-commerce (Roy, 2003). Its benefits include 
reduced paperwork, a more specific reportage and improved control (Roy, 2003). 
The reason why e-procurement and P-cards have often been referred to as possible remedies 
against maverick buying lies in the fact that, in theory the technologies allow full spend 
visibility to the purchases of the organization (Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016). In other words, 
all the transactions of the organization could be monitored electronically. This is highly 
related with monitoring the employees’ buying activities and is linked with the decrease of 
their task-autonomy, which was identified as the most prevalent contributing factor to 
maverick buying by Karjalainen and van Raaij (2011). Such technologies thus make it harder 
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for the employees to engage in maverick buying without being detected (Rothkopf and 
Pibernik, 2016).  On the other hand, with the P-card allowing companies to make lists of 
approved suppliers (Roy, 2003), it may have been expected that this type of listing would 
reduce maverick purchases from non-approved suppliers. Karjalainen et al. (2009) suggested 
as well, that better contract-awareness might be achieved through e-procurement tools which 
would result in the decrease of unintentional MB. In addition, as Rothkopf and Pibernik 
(2016) state, e-procurement and P-card may make the compliant purchase option more 
attractive than the maverick option (Angeles and Nath, 2007), as they decrease the 
employees’ effort of buying via framework agreements. The purchasing process is thus made 
more automated. 
However, as Rothkopf and Pibernik (2016) argue, there is not much empirical evidence on 
how these technologies in fact aid at reducing maverick buying. In the contrary, Angeles and 
Nath (2007) name maverick buying as a challenge in implementing e-procurement tools 
successfully. This is perhaps due to the maverick buyers not using the preferred systems. In 
other words, while these technology tools may help in reducing some of maverick buying, 
maverick buying simultaneously decreases their efficiency and eats away their expected 
benefits. Kulp et al. (2006) support this in their case study stating that noncompliance, such 
as maverick buying, prevent these tools from fully realizing their expected results of savings 
and cost reductions. Technological solutions such as e-procurement tools and P-cards are 
thus not a sole solution to the problem. In order for these technologies to result in their full 
expected benefits and to reduce maverick buying as a part of them, the occurrence of 
maverick buying diminishing their efficiency should be solved in other ways. Other 
suggestions are thus needed. 
4.2 Reward and sanction systems and monitoring 
The implementation of reward sanction systems is another commonly suggested remedy 
against maverick buying. This would mean either giving incentives that would lead the 
employees towards compliant buying and thus getting rewards for that, or punishing the 
employees in the opposite case. In the latter option, companies often implement monitoring 
systems to detect and penalize maverick buying, as Rothkopf and Pibernik (2016) state. 
Reward and sanction systems are thus linked together with monitoring in this paper. 
Karjalainen et al. (2009) mentioned the lack of incentives to comply to be one of the reasons 
behind maverick buying. It would thus seem that compatible incentive systems could result 
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in decrease of maverick buying. However, the incentives should be aligned correctly, as 
misaligning them could result in the employee’s or unit’s best interest being different from 
that of the organization and thus result in ill-intentioned maverick buying (Karjalainen et al., 
2009; Cox et al., 2005). In other words, the principal – agent problem would get deepened. 
Kulp et al. (2006) point out in their case study that the incentive should be for example to 
get the employees to purchase on the negotiated rates rather than to get the central purchase 
unit to negotiate the rates. The rewards should thus be on realized savings instead of the 
potential or estimated savings through framework agreements put in place (Kulp et al., 
2006). Their main idea in this was to motivate the central purchasing unit to contribute in 
getting the employees to engage in compliant purchasing. To specify, Kulp et al. (2006) add 
that the incentive system should also encourage the employees to use the approved suppliers 
even if that would mean buying a single item at a higher price than from a local supplier in 
order to get the employees to act in the best interest of the whole organization rather than 
just themselves or their unit. 
It could be concluded that in order for the reward sanction systems to reduce maverick 
buying, they should be rather carefully designed and have specific features in them. 
Furthermore, in order to be able to measure the employees’ performance on the incentive 
system, the measure should be informative of their effort (cf. Kulp et al., 2006). The 
organization should thus be able to track the employee’s purchasing activities, whether it is 
to prove and reward their compliant behavior or to detect and penalize their noncompliant 
behavior. Thus, rewards and sanction systems require monitoring in order for them to be 
informative and used consistently. In addition, Karjalainen and van Raaij (2011) found in 
their empirical study that at least in public organizations the presence of reward and sanction 
systems did not affect the levels of maverick buying. 
Monitoring itself is a commonly brought up suggestion against maverick buying (Rothkop 
and Pibernik, 2016) as well, as it decreases the employees’ task autonomy and provides 
spend visibility. However, as Rothkopf and Pibernik (2016) point out, such monitoring 
requires increasing efforts correlating with the level of monitoring and thus results in 
increasing costs. Kulp et al. (2006) support this by noting that while compliance techniques 
can bring savings, the investments in resources and human capital as well as the marginal 
costs of tracking should be taken into notice. Implementing such a system would thus also 
require optimizing the level of monitoring effort with the benefits gained from reducing 
maverick buying. Furthermore, it is often not easy to distinguish controllable actions from 
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circumstances beyond the employee’s control in such systems (Kulp et al., 2006) which in 
the worst case could cause rewarding or penalizing an employee on false base. It would thus 
seem that neither reward and sanction systems nor monitoring are an exhaustive solution to 
reducing maverick buying either. 
To sum up, this section has examined the four more commonly suggested ways to reduce 
maverick buying from previous literature, those being e-procurement, the P-card, reward and 
sanction systems and monitoring. Out of these four e-procurement and monitoring are the 
most often mentioned (Karjalainen et al., 2009; Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016), and thus can 
be seen having the most potential. However, having gone through the four suggestions it can 
be concluded that none of them provides a sole solution as a remedy against maverick 
buying. The efficiency of the suggested remedies lies mostly in decreasing the employee’s 
task autonomy, which was the most important contributing factor to maverick buying 
(Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011). They decrease task autonomy through improved spend 
visibility, through more automated and monitored purchasing activities and through 
guidance towards usage of approved suppliers, and are thus expected to reduce maverick 
buying. However, as brought up in the above section, while these suggestions have partial 
potential in reducing maverick buying, they all seem to possess factors that prevent them 
from being an exhaustive answer to the problem; maverick buying eats away their efficiency 
itself or the cost and effort of implementing and keeping up such systems makes it not 
worthwhile to use them excessively. It is thus needed to seek for other possible solutions to 
the problem and the next section of this paper continues by doing so. 
5. Reducing maverick buying in the context of organizational change 
 
As can be seen, several remedies against maverick buying have been proposed in the earlier 
literature, of which e-procurement and monitoring being the ones mentioned most often 
(Karjalainen et al., 2009; Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016). Most of these proposals are of 
technical or monitorial nature however. While all of them have been suggested or even 
proved to bring great benefits in reducing maverick buying, none of them seem to have been 
an unambiguous solution for overcoming maverick buying all together. In other words, they 
all seem to have “flaws” which allow maverick buying to persist even after their 
implementation. This would suggest, that there is no sole solution to reducing maverick 
buying all together but rather that a more diverse solution is needed. 
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As Karjalainen et al. (2009) point out, the technical solutions, referring to tools of e-
procurement and monitoring, do not address the emotional motivations behind maverick 
buying. They don’t take away the “feelings of injustice and powerlessness, or the perception 
that a better deal can be achieved outside the corporate framework agreement” (Karjalainen 
et al., 2009, p.253). It thus seems that other ways to address these emotional needs in order 
to reduce maverick buying are needed there. Furthermore, reward and sanction systems, as 
stated, have not been found to contribute to maverick buying (Karjalainen and van Raaij, 
2011) and thus can’t be seen as a way to reduce maverick buying either. In addition to these 
findings, the previous suggestions against maverick buying seem to focus on reducing it 
when it is already occurring and when the framework agreements have already been put in 
place. Perhaps another point of view is needed; that of preventing maverick buying while 
negotiating the contracts. All contracts expire sooner or later and need to be renewed, and 
perhaps that is the optimal time for looking at the process more carefully and aiming at the 
reduction of future maverick buying. Furthermore, the feelings of injustice and 
powerlessness mentioned by Karjalainen et al. (2009) could perhaps be addressed earlier on 
before them resulting in MB. 
A yet to be examined aspect of maverick buying is its connection to organizational change. 
When an organization’s procurement is centralized to a central purchasing department and 
new corporate level framework agreements negotiated by this department are put in place, it 
inevitably causes a change in the organization. While the management of the supplier base, 
the negotiation of the frame contracts and the responsibility of the consolidation of purchase 
volumes and achieving its positive effects is transferred to the central purchasing department 
(Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016), the remaining operational procurement activities such as the 
actual ordering rights stay or are newly delegated to individual units or local managers (cf. 
Karjalainen, 2011). The responsibilities of procurement tasks are thus newly organized 
which results in a change of employees’ authorities, responsibilities and tasks. As Kulp et 
al. (2006) state, whenever organizations change their processes they should also change their 
control mechanisms in accordance. The processes being in this case the ones involved in 
procurement, this statement could be extended to the change of all related activities. This 
would suggest that the change caused by the centralization creates the need for changes in 
the organization’s systems and mechanisms supporting compliance as well. 
As maverick buying is identified to occur outside the framework agreements set up by the 
central purchasing department, a link between the change of reorganizing the procurement 
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roles and responsibilities and maverick buying can be established. It is thus logical to look 
into reducing maverick buying in the context of organizational change. If the right incentives 
ensuring compliance in purchasing are ones that reward contract usage instead of closing 
contracts (Kulp et al., 2006) surely the success of consolidating purchase volumes should be 
measured by how widely the framework contracts are in use. As Cox et al. (2005) point out, 
conflicting interests between the central purchasing unit and the contract-users as a whole 
can either help or hinder a change within an organization. In the case of maverick buying 
the result will thus be the latter and the success of the organizational change in question gets 
burdened. Furthermore, as Van der Voet et al. (2016) state, the employees’ level of 
commitment to change is highly dependent on the way the organizational change is 
implemented - the process of change. This only highlights that the emphasis in reducing 
maverick buying and thus providing a successful change to using the framework contracts 
requires an emphasis on managing the change itself. Put to this context it may be possible to 
discover new ideas on how to grasp the problem of MB when negotiating new framework 
contracts and thus other suggestions on how to reduce maverick buying. 
Organizational changes are usually divided in planned changes and emergent changes 
(Bamford and Forrester, 2003). Planned changes are initiated top-down and their objectives 
are set in advance while emergent changes are more of bottom-up processes where the 
participation of employees is more crucial (Van der Voet et al., 2016). Putting framework 
contracts in place can thus be traditionally seen as a planned change. However, this paper 
now focuses on examining the organizational change of consolidating purchasing volumes 
and reducing maverick buying from both aspects; both planned and emergent change. This 
will be done by combining other less technical suggestions on how to decrease maverick 
buying such as purchasing leadership (Karjalainen et al., 2009), participation menus 
(Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016) and training, guidance and involvement in the process 
(Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011; Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015) with the named change 
processes. The aim in doing so is to address the context of organizational change apparent 
in organizations implementing and applying corporate level framework agreements, and the 
emotional factors behind maverick buying. 
 
5.1 Planned change 
As planned changes are top-down processes with ready formulated objectives, they can be 
seen as rather programmatic (Van der Voet et al., 2016). The initiative for the change coming 
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from the management, the importance of top-down communication gets emphasized (Van 
der Voet et al., 2016). When centralizing purchasing volumes to be managed by the central 
purchasing unit, the change process can be seen to be coming from top-down and the 
objectives of lower purchasing costs and increased purchasing leverage are set in advance. 
The change can thus be seen as a process moving from one “fixed state” to another through 
several pre-planned steps (Bamford and Forrester, 2003). This “action research” model of 
planned change process alongside with another one called the “three-step model” are 
principally based on Kurt Lewin’s work on change management (Bamford and Forrester, 
2003). In the three-step model the process of change is managed through three phases; the 
“fixed state” is first “unfreezed”, the new ideas and approaches are then explored that being 
the “change” and finally the new desired values, attitudes and skills are identified, utilized 
and integrated with the previously held ones “refreezing” the state (cf. Bamford and 
Forrester, 2003). While consolidating purchasing volumes this would mean first the previous 
state of scattered purchasing volumes across various suppliers being “unfreezed”. Following 
would be the process of change, introducing the organization with the new idea of framework 
contracts and finally putting the contracts in place with the end-users ideally using them and 
finally refreezing this new desired state. 
It could be argued that organizations typically move onto negotiating their framework 
contracts using the first mentioned model, trying to move directly from one state to another. 
Perhaps this is resulting in maverick buying. As Bamford and Forrester (2003) state, before 
any new behavior can be fully accepted and adopted successfully, the old one has to be 
abandoned. This would suggest that if the organizational change is merely implemented 
without addressing the needed change from an old behavior to the new one, the old one will 
persist. In the case of implementing framework contracts in use, the change will thus not be 
successful, and end-users persist in their old ways that being now perceived as maverick 
buying. Having recognized this fact, some suggestions on how to address the missing second 
phase of the planned change process are made. 
Van der Voet et al. (2016) emphasize the importance of transformational leadership and that 
of the direct supervisors in particular when implementing organizational change. 
Transformational leaders provide employees with appealing visions about organizational 
changes and encourage them to accept the offered solutions (cf. Van der Voet et al., 2016). 
This contributes to and stimulates the occurrence of organizational changes resulting in 
enhanced commitment to change and employee participation (Van der Voet et al., 2016). 
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Van der Voet et al. (2016) argue that the central leadership role is that of the direct 
supervisors and their study results suggest that the main ways to gain support for change 
among employees are communication and participation. When it comes to maverick buying, 
Karjalainen et al. (2009) suggested lack of purchasing leadership to be a factor increasing 
certain forms of maverick buying. Taking these findings into account, it could be concluded 
that in order to prevent and/or reduce maverick buying when putting framework contracts in 
place, a strong role of leadership is needed to encourage the employees to accept the 
suggested change and to implement it successfully. 
 
As Van der Voet et al. (2016) discovered a link between leadership in implementing change 
and communication and involvement in the process, these factors can be seen as essential in 
ensuring and improving contract usage. Lack of communication and involvement in the 
process as well as training were identified as contributing factors to maverick buying as well 
(Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011), so increasing them would thus result in reduced levels of 
MB. Kauppi and van Raaij (2015) support this by stating that reducing maverick buying 
requires first and foremost raising the awareness level of both the principal and the agent so 
their goals would be more in congruence and information more symmetrical. This can be 
achieved through increased communication. Kauppi and van Raaij (2015) continue that the 
central procurement unit should continuously guide and mentor the internal clients as well 
as inform them of the frame agreements in place and the reasoning behind the change. In 
other words, it is important to communicate the guidelines of the organization’s purchasing 
procedures and simultaneously improve the overall contract awareness and increase the level 
of training on purchasing in general as well as on purchasing activities in order to reduce 
maverick buying (cf. Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011). Taking into account the results of 
Van der Voet et al. (2016) the central purchasing unit should expand this training and 
communication to the direct supervisors of the end-users as well; thus they would have the 
means to encourage and enforce the process as well as support the employees’ commitment 
to change through leadership. To conclude, the context of planned organizational change 
supports and emphasizes the findings of other studies (Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015; 
Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011) on reducing maverick buying. 
 
5.2 Emergent change 
The above described process of planned change has received some criticism on its 
applicability in the increasingly fast-changing and uncertain business environment, its 
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reliance on managers and dependence on detailed step-to-step plans (Bamford and Forrester, 
2003). As it’s based on the assumptions that organizations would operate under constant 
conditions and that all stakeholders in the change process would feel positive about 
implementing it, it has been argued that it wouldn’t be ideal in cases where major and rapid 
changes are required (cf. Bamford and Forrester, 2003; By, 2005). Thus the idea of an 
emergent change has been introduced. The major difference in the emergent change process 
compared to that of the planned change is that it is seen to be implemented from bottom-up 
rather than top-down (Bamford and Forrester, 2003). As its argued that it is impossible for 
senior management to identify, plan and implement every action required in the change 
process (Bamford and Forrester, 2003), the emergent change has no objectives set in advance 
and they are formulated during the process instead (cf. Van der Voet et al., 2016). By (2005) 
points out, that the emergent approach to the process of change emphasizes the change 
readiness and facilitating for change instead of planning steps for each individual change 
and initiative. According to Van der Voet et al. (2016) emergent changes rely more on the 
participation of employees; instead of being merely informed about the change the 
employees are invited to participate in the implementation process. They add that emergent 
change processes stimulate both the quality of change communication and the degree of 
employee participation, resulting in improved change commitment. 
Brought to the context of centralizing purchasing volumes, an emergent change would thus 
mean that the initiative to negotiate framework contracts would come from bottom-up from 
the internal clients of the organization. While this seems unusual in the typical setting where 
it’s the central purchasing unit negotiating these contracts, Van der Voet et al. (2016) point 
out that the management can initiate emergent changes but that they don’t formulate detailed 
objectives for the change. The commencement for the tendering process for a product or 
service could thus still be coming from the central purchasing unit but they should invite the 
employees to participate in the process. As stated, lack of involvement in the process was 
one of the factors contributing to maverick buying (Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011) and 
thus the opposite would result in reducing maverick buying, or preventing it in the context 
of organizational change. Karjalainen and van Raaij (2011) found that involving the 
employees in the process of putting framework contracts in place might increase their 
commitment to the change and that the end-users would thus be more likely satisfied and 
convinced with the results. It could be argued that in this case the possible feelings of 
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injustice and powerlessness mentioned by Karjalainen et al (2009) would be addressed early 
on in the change process itself. 
A rather recent suggestion on reducing maverick buying through different kind of 
participation of the internal clients is the “participation menu” introduced by Rothkopf and 
Pibernik (2016). The foundation of their suggestion is that under some conditions, especially 
when traditional efforts to reduce maverick buying such as monitoring fail and the agents 
have skills to discover attractive options of buying outside the framework contracts, the 
principal (the central purchasing unit) should offer the agents a contract menu – a termed 
participation menu (Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016). With this they refer to participating or 
even leveraging the suggested superior purchasing capabilities of the agent. Rothkopf and 
Pibernik (2016) suggest that the central purchasing unit and the individuals or units 
responsible for the operative procurement should exchange information about the feasibility 
and attractiveness of the framework contract and the possible outside options. The agents 
would thus have the opportunity and even an incentive to communicate any other purchase 
options to the principal which would result in a shared decision on whether to use the 
framework contract or an attractive outside option and in shared benefits. The participation 
menus apply especially when the maverick buyers are successful buyers and succeed in 
making better deals than the framework ones. Thus when communicating the features of 
both options, if the consolidation benefits are high the agent will be likely to engage in using 
the framework contract in order to gain the same benefits (Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016). 
Meanwhile, if the consolidation benefits are comparatively low, the principal should actually 
leverage the agent’s superior market knowledge and this way achieve the improved benefits 
for the whole organization (Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016). 
While participation menus as a formal model on reducing and participating maverick buying 
is rather distinct from previous suggestions in the literature, it can be seen to have aspects of 
emergent change process in it. Furthermore, it provides a new perspective to the issue; 
whether maverick buying could be harnessed to serve the organization. The framework 
contracts are initiated by the principal (the central purchasing unit) but then offered to the 
agents (individuals and units in charge of day-to-day procurement activities) to participate; 
the objectives are thus set through participation and information exchange. All in all, this 
approach aims at gaining the highest mutual benefits with less effort; maverick buying would 
be reduced and/or prevented and purchasing costs saved. 
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To sum up, the focus on reducing maverick buying has typically been only after 
consolidating purchasing volumes and putting up framework contracts. Furthermore, it 
hasn’t addressed the feelings of injustice and powerlessness that employees may experience 
due to the process (Karjalainen et al., 2009). As brought up in the above section, the act of 
centralizing purchases results in an organizational change that should be taken into account. 
It could be argued that managing this change poorly results in maverick buying and that the 
emphasis on reducing maverick buying or rather in preventing it should be during the 
tendering process of negotiating the framework contracts; either when starting the change of 
putting them in place or when renewing them. The two most dominant types of 
organizational change processes, the planned and the emergent change (Bamford and 
Forrester, 2003) were introduced as a starting point to this approach on examining the issue. 
While the planned change seems to be the more typical one used in putting framework 
contracts in place, some suggestions of remedies against MB (eg. Karjalainen and van Raaij, 
2011; Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016) suggest that the approach of emergent changes might 
be one to consider more extensively in the future. Finally, ways to reduce maverick buying 
were suggested in both cases; communication, guidance and training being the ones for 
planned change and employee involvement in the change process as well as participation 
menus as a more recent one being the ones for emergent change (Figure 4). It was also 
recognized that in either case, strong leadership was needed as it was seen to stimulate both 
types of change (Van der Voet et al., 2016) and also suggested as a possible factor 
contributing to the decrease of maverick buying (Karjalainen et al., 2009) (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Reducing maverick buying in the context of organizational change 
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6. Managerial implications 
 
As managerial implications, this paper suggests in its findings that organizations should 
move the focus on reducing maverick buying to an earlier stage of the process and thus on 
preventing its occurrence. As the previous suggestions on ways to reduce maverick buying 
seem to address the problem only when it is already occurring, organizations should look 
into the circumstances in which it is created; the organizational change created by purchasing 
consolidation and the implementation of framework contracts. The findings of this paper 
suggest that leaving this change unaddressed corresponds with the low level of change 
commitment occurring as maverick buying. Consequently, organizations should emphasize 
the attention put into the change process and focus on the role of leadership in it; that of the 
central purchasing unit as well as direct supervisors. Thus, the focus in finding remedies 
against maverick buying should be on improving communication between the principal and 
agents and increasing the agent’s participation opportunities already during the tendering 
process. 
Another implication of this paper is introducing the idea of the change process of putting 
framework contracts in place as being an emergent one. Emergent change processes have 
been found to have a naturally higher level of employee participation and thus a higher level 
of commitment to change as well. In such processes the emphasis on the role of leadership 
and more importantly on involvement in the process and employee participation are 
highlighted. In the context of this study, the main implication is that while consolidating 
their purchasing volumes, organizations should perhaps opt for characteristics of emergent 
change processes, enabling them to draw upon the hidden assets of the organization. This 
approach examines the possibility of even harnessing successful maverick buying; whether 
it could be leveraged through employee participation and used to gain the highest benefits 
for the whole organization. While this seems like a rather distinct approach to the issue, it is 
one to be looked into more extensively in the future. 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, the phenomenon of non-compliant purchasing behavior – maverick buying – 
has been looked into from various point of views. Doing so a broad understanding of the 
issue was gained in order to examine the previously suggested remedies against maverick 
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buying critically. The findings of this examination would suggest that out of the most 
commonly suggested ways to reduce maverick buying such as e-procurement tools and the 
P-card, monitoring systems and rewards sanction systems none were efficient as a sole 
solution to the problem. Furthermore, they seemed to tackle only task autonomy out of the 
contributing factors of maverick buying identified by Karjalainen and van Raaij (2011) and 
left the emotional factors mentioned by Karjalainen et al. (2009) unaddressed. 
This paper thus moved onto identifying a new approach to the phenomenon; recognizing 
consolidation of purchasing volumes and putting framework contracts in place as an 
organizational change. As Kulp et al. (2006) pointed out, whenever organizations change 
their processes they should also change their control mechanisms in accordance. This new 
approach thus suggested a need for other types of ways to reduce maverick buying. 
Furthermore, the approach of this paper guides the focus on reducing maverick buying or 
rather preventing it to be advanced already to the tendering process - to the process of 
change. 
Two common approaches on organizational change were then recognized; the planned and 
the emergent change process (Bamford and Forrester, 2003), and the link between the 
process in which the change is implemented and the level of change commitment among the 
internal clients was established (cf. Van der Voet et al., 2016). This connection was then 
applied to the case of maverick buying; a successful implementation of framework contracts 
would mean a broad contract-usage and thus a reduction of maverick buying. As suggestions 
on how to prevent maverick buying in this context, the importance of communication and 
participation as well as training and guidance were highlighted (Van der Voet et al., 2016; 
Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011; Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015). In addition, the role of 
leadership stimulating both types of changes (Van der Voet et al., 2016) was found to be 
important in implementing these changes, for both top-down and bottom-up initiations. 
Finally, it was suggested, that perhaps when aiming at reducing maverick buying a new 
approach of bottom-up change process and a more extensive end-user participation is 
needed. 
While the main contribution of this paper is in introducing the context of organizational 
change to the case of maverick buying and thus providing suggestions on preventing the 
phenomenon, some further research is needed. This paper examined the processes of planned 
and emergent changes and their connection on putting framework contracts in place. 
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However, more extensive studies on identifying the ideal change management framework 
for procurement should be conducted. Furthermore, future research should focus on 
empirical testing on organizations using these approaches in order to achieve concrete 
suggestions on ways to tackle the problem and evidence to support the ideas introduced in 
this paper. Finally, research on the efficiency of these suggestions on the different forms of 
maverick buying is needed. 
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